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We examine the transition process from a centrally planned to a market-based monetary sys-
tem in China, with the objective of giving a functional form to the transition in money de-
mand. Applying the cointegrating Time-Varying Smooth Transition Regression model pro-
posed by Choi and Saikkonen (2004) on a constructed dataset spanning the period from 1984 
to 2010, and using a seasonal unit-root test developed by Hylleberg et al. (1990), our findings 
invalidate much of the earlier literature. Our examination of disaggregate as well as aggregate 
money balances yields the following findings. (1) Households have an infinite demand for 
money at prevailing interest rates. (2) Enterprises have gradually gained decision-making au-
thority over their deposits. (3) Money is a complement rather than a substitute to capital and 
this has become more prominent over the period. (4) The credit plan has ceased to be a sig-
nificant driver of money holdings after 1997. (5) In the aggregate monetary sphere, the de-
posit interest rate has gained only a minor role as a monetary instrument, and only since 2000.  
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Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan Kiinan rahankysynnän siirtymää keskusjohtoisesta markkinapoh-
jaiseen järjestelmään. Tutkimus perustuu vuodet 1984–2010 kattavaan aineistoon, johon so-
velletaan Choi-Saikkosen (2004) regressiomallia sekä Hyllebergin et al. (1990)  yksikköjuuri-
testiä. Saadut tulokset vaikuttavat kumoavan merkittävän osan aikaisemman kirjallisuuden 
tuloksista.  Tutkimuksessa  huomataan,  että  1)  kotitalouksien  rahankysyntä  on  vallitsevalla 
korkotasolla ääretön, 2) yritysten päätösvalta omien talletustensa suhteen on kasvanut, 3) raha 
on pikemminkin komplementti kuin substituutti pääomalle, 4) viralliset luottosuunnitelmat 
eivät vuoden 1997 jälkeen ole merkittävästi ohjanneet rahan hallussapitoa ja 5) talletuskorolla 
on vain vähäinen merkitys rahapoliittisena instrumenttina, minkä  lisäksi tämä vaikutus oli 
olematon ennen vuotta 2000. 
 
Asiasanat: rahan kysyntä, yhteisintegroituvuus, kausivaihtelun huomioon ottava yksikköjuuri-
testi, Kiinan talous 
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I    Introduction 
 
In the second half of the 1990s, the central bank of China adopted an annual money supply 
target. Money supply targeting is an effective way to conduct monetary policy if there is a 
strong and linear relationship between the goal variable—inflation or nominal income—and 
the targeted monetary aggregate. However, there are a number of reasons why money demand 
may be non-linear, particularly in countries undergoing a transition from plan to market.  
First, a slowdown in money velocity due to the monetization process during eco-
nomic take-off may cause a progressive increase in the elasticity of money with respect to in-
come. This elasticity is likely to go back to unity once the process is completed. Second, the 
complementarity hypothesis between money and capital (McKinnon, 1973) states that, in de-
veloping economies with limited access by households and small enterprises to external fi-
nance, money is accumulated to self-finance investment.  In a transition economy such as 
China,  the  (changing)  extent  to  which  the  complementarity  hypothesis  holds  influences 
money demand. Third, the emergence of a financial market implies that households can allo-
cate their savings alternatively to cash or interest-bearing assets such as stocks and bonds. The 
opportunity cost of holding money thus emerges in a money demand function with the devel-
opment and deepening of financial markets.  Fourth, institutions can impose defining con-
straints on the role of money. Some of the constraints of China‘s pre-reform institutions con-
tinue into the reform period, thus potentially causing money demand to be non-linear.  
Earlier literature ignored the possibility of non-linear money demand in China alto-
gether. Chow (1987) published a well-known study in which he provided evidence that sup-
ported the existence of a stable relation between money, income and prices, using annual data 
from 1952 to 1983. The same year, Feltenstein and Farhadian (1987) argued that a proper es-
timation of the money demand in China must take into account prices rigidities that are due to 
strict controls enforced by the central planning authority. Their central message was that in 
order to capture a stable money demand function in China, one has to take into account do-
mestic specificities.  
Subsequently, the search for a stable money demand function took two different di-
rections. The first direction focused on a correct definition of money and opportunity cost in 
China (Huang, 1994, Hafer and Kutan, 1994, Chen, 1997, Chow and Shen, 2004, Gerlach and 
Kong, 2005, Mehrotra, 2006, Laurens and Maino, 2007, Bahmani, Oskee and Wang, 2007). A 
common result of these studies is that there exists a stable long run money demand, and de-Anne-Laure Delatte, Julien Fouquau and  
Carsten A. Holz 
Explaining money demand in China during the transition  
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posit interest rates work as a significant opportunity cost of holding money. A second direc-
tion was taken by those who suspected that the conventional definition of the money supply 
does not apply in China and that institutional factors representative of the transition pro cess 
must be taken into consideration include Qin (1994), Girardin (1996), Xu (1998), Hasan 
(1999), and Yu and Tsui (2000).  
None of these publications pays much attention to the institutional details of China‘s 
pre-reform monetary system. But money in pre-reform China did not constitute a uniform ag-
gregate: the task of the pre-reform financial system was to maintain the flow of two types of 
monies, with very different functions, through two very different channels. In the household 
circuit, enterprises made wage and salary payments in cash (only), and this currency in circu-
lation could then be used to purchase consumer goods (only) or to save at state banks. In the 
enterprise circuit, enterprises purchased materials and capital goods from other enterprises 
using transfer money, i.e., bank transfers of deposits, only. Each of the two circuits was sub-
ject to different types of controls exercised by the planning authorities. It is only in the course 
of the reform period that the two circuits began to merge and money began to adopt more of 
the functions it plays in market economies. Consequently, we first consider the demand for 
money separately for the household and the enterprise circuits, incorporating the limitations to 
the uses of the different monies, before we move on to aggregate formulations of money de-
mand.  
Only  three  papers  have  investigated  non-linear,  i.e.,  non-stable  relationships,  and 
then only with limited regard to institutional details. Lee and Chien (2008) tested the presence 
of structural changes and identified one major structural breakpoint in 1993. The drawback is 
that China is likely to have followed a smooth economic transition process while their model 
includes only two regimes. Austin, Ward and Dalziel (2007) examined non-linearities affect-
ing only the adjustment process to equilibrium. Their approach implies the existence of a sin-
gle equilibrium relationship towards which money adjusts in each period, in a process that 
they allow to be non-linear, rather than allowing the equilibrium to evolve. Zuo and Park 
(2011) used a time-varying cointegration approach based on Park and Hahn (1999). A time-
varying cointegration method seems the proper strategy to account for the smooth structural 
changes in China. However, their estimation is based on 52 quarterly observations from 1996 
to  2009,  less  than  the  critical  sample  size  to  yield  robust  results.  In  addition,  Choi  and 
Saikkonen (2004) have pointed out a statistical limitation of Park and Phillips‘ work (1999, BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 27/ 2011 
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2001): the specific assumption that the instability is only due to a martingale difference errors. 
They propose a more general procedure (that we adopt in this paper).  
We use the non-linear cointegration methodology proposed by Choi and Saikkonen 
(2004) to test the null hypothesis of a linear cointegrated money demand relationship in China 
against the cointegrating Time-Varying Smooth Transition Regression (TV-STR) model. This 
modeling strategy allows us to relax the restrictive and potentially unrealistic assumption of 
stable coefficients in the relationship. The parameters are allowed to change smoothly as a 
function of time, which is more consistent with the gradual transition process of China than a 
structural break is. In other words, we test the hypothesis that the elasticities of the demand 
for money have changed over time. This model allows us to capture changes in monetary pol-
icy and in the behavior of Chinese firms and households towards money. The evolution of the 
elasticities reveals significant changes in the way money interacts with economic develop-
ment.  
Compared to the earlier literature, we, first, use a transition function that allows for a 
non-linear transition, rather than assuming (and testing for) the existence of one stable money 
demand function, or allowing for at most two states (Lee and Chien, 2008). Second, we build 
our work on a rigorous theoretical framework that we develop by examining the institutional 
details of China‘s financial transition. (In the literature, only Xu, 1998, gives some thought to 
financial  sector  idiosyncrasies.)  The  papers  that  have  investigated  non-linearities  have  all 
adopted a conventional definition of the money demand that would not seem to be appropriate 
given China‘s recent economic history. Third, we use a meticulously constructed dataset that 
goes well beyond what the standard databases offer, and we also cover a longer time period, 
reaching all the way from 1984 to end-2010. To our knowledge, it is the first paper on China 
money demand based on quarterly data going back to 1984. The length of this time span con-
siderably increases the power of the empirical tests in comparison to previous studies, and 
also facilitates tracing transition processes. Fourth, to assess the presence of stochastic, possi-
bly non-stationary, seasonal effects, we use a seasonal unit-root test developed by Hylleberg 
et al. (1990). As it turns out, the consideration of seasonal unit roots invalidates much of the 
earlier literature, none of which has considered seasonal unit roots. Ghysels and Perron (1993) 
showed that failing to account for seasonal unit roots leads to biased (underestimated) coeffi-
cients,  while  prefiltering  the  series  using  period-to-period  differences  alter  the  stochastic 
structure of series (Franses, 1997).  Anne-Laure Delatte, Julien Fouquau and  
Carsten A. Holz 
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The following section reviews the salient features of the institutional developments 
in China‘s financial system. It serves as the foundation from which we derive the long-term 
relationships to be estimated. Section II presents our data and the results of the seasonal unit-
root tests. Section III reports the results of the linear estimation. Section IV introduces the 
cointegrating  Time-Varying  Smooth  Transition  Regression  and  explains  the  linearity  and 
specification tests. We present our non-linear results and implications in Section V. Section 
VI concludes.  
 
 
II    Money Demand in China: Institutional Background 
 
In the pre-reform, socialist system, the volume of output was determined by the physical plan 
and prices were fixed. Money fulfilled little more than an accounting function. China‘s central 
bank, the People‘s Bank of China (PBC), controlled the quantity of cash held by households 
on the one hand, and the amount of deposits held by enterprises on the other hand. Cash 
flowed from the banking system to households according to plan and was withdrawn from the 
economy through clearly defined channels such as retail sales. Loans were extended to firms 
in accordance with the ―commodity inventory system:‖ loans were made available when a 
firm purchased inputs needed for production, and repaid once the final products were sold.
1 
While the volume of loans determined the volume of deposits, enterprises, furthermore, could 
only use these deposits according to plan. Money—cash for households and deposits for en-
terprises—thus strictly followed the physical plans.  
By 2010, all control over cash disbursements by banks has disappeared, as has any 
attempt to control the amount and usage of enterprise deposits. Money is no longer simply an 
accounting unit. Money matters for inflation, for economic growth, and for employment. The 
transition involved a large number of small, often incremental reforms, all, invariably, affect-
ing the demand for money. 
 
                                                 
1The commodity inventory system specifies that (working capital) credit be extended directly to the user in ac-
cordance with specific plans and for specific purposes on the basis of material inventories held by the economic 
unit. Enterprises are required to promptly pay back their loans to the banks when the commodities that were used 
to back the loan are transferred outside the enterprise. (See De Wulf 1986.) The commodity inventory system 
represents the socialist economy‘s application of the ―real bills principle.‖ BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 27/ 2011 
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A  The monetary system in the transition process 
 
The centrally planned economy is characterized by two distinct circuits, the household circuit 
on the one hand and the enterprise circuit on the other hand. (See Figure 1.) In the household 
circuit, enterprises make all wage and salary payments to households in cash according to 
plan; enterprises are state-owned and follow nationwide wage and salary scales. Households 
use their cash receipts to consume and, with interest rates and inflation at very low levels 
(prices are government-determined and rarely adjusted), are near-indifferent between holding 
any excess cash receipts in cash or depositing them in the bank. In the absence of household 
checking accounts, all household use of money consists of the use of cash.
2  
 
Figure 1  Enterprise and Household Circuits in the Centrally Planned Economy (page 47) 
 
In the enterprise circuit, enterprises buy producer goods from other enterprises. All payments 
between enterprises are made through the transfer of deposits between bank accounts, using 
―transfer,‖ or ―book‖ money. Enterprises‘ wage and salary payments, in cash, through ear-
marked accounts, are subject to rigorous cash administration. Enterprises have access to their 
transfer money in bank accounts to purchase producer goods only if the physical transaction 
has been approved by the relevant state organ; enterprises are prohibited from purchasing 
consumer goods.   
The organization of the monetary system into two separate, strictly controlled cir-
cuits has implications for monetary policy. With household income barely above subsistence 
level, the supply of consumer goods has to meet little more than the demand for food and eve-
ryday household goods. Furthermore, prices are state-determined and fixed. In the household 
circuit, thus, there is no need for active monetary policy.
3 In the enterprise circuit, imbalances 
between the demand and supply of producer goods cannot arise a s long as all transactions 
scrupulously follow the physical plan. Furthermore, producer prices are also state-determined 
and fixed. In the enterprise circuit, thus, there is likewise no need for active monetary policy, 
and any concept of money demand is irrelevant.
4 
                                                 
2 On the concept of two circuits also see Dembinski (1988) and Holz (2000). 
3The monetary or planning authorities could have used interest rates on household deposits to influence hous e-
hold consumption decisions, but perhaps there was no need —between 1959 and 1979 interest rates in the PRC 
were adjusted twice, and then only marginally (Finance Yearbook 1990, p. 167). 
4 Walter (1985, 290) argues for the case of the PRC that after an unsuccessful credit reform in 1956, ―the Peo-
ple‘s Bank [the only financial intermediary] came to focus primarily on developing its savings operations, which, 
in contrast to the credit reforms, enjoyed strong local Party support.‖ Anne-Laure Delatte, Julien Fouquau and  
Carsten A. Holz 
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Without the need for monetary policy or the fulfillment of any significant allocative 
function by financial intermediaries, a monobank suffices.
5 In the case of the People‘s Repub-
lic of China, that was the People‘s Bank of China (PBC). Between 1969 and 1977, the PBC 
was integrated into the Finance Ministry. Other financial intermediaries and financial markets 
did not exist. The only other source of financial resources was the state budget which pro-
vided all funding for investment in fixed assets as well as a certain amount of ―fixed-quota‖ 
working capital.
6  
The PRC‘s pre-reform period financial system was inherently stable. But once eco-
nomic reforms in the real sphere began, the monetary system had to adapt. The reform period 
brought about a fundamental change in the functions of money: as enterprises were given the 
right to make their own production and investment decisions, they also needed the freedom to 
retain deposits and to decide on the use of these deposits. Money demand of enterprises be-
came a meaningful concept.  
In the early 1980s, enterprises began to supplement planned wage and salary pay-
ments with bonus payments. (See Figure 2.) The total wage bill increased and became a priori 
indeterminate.
7 Rising household income meant that the share of easily planned food and eve-
ryday household good purchases in total household expenditures declined. The planning b u-
reaucracy subsequently lost partial control over the extent of cash disbursements by the bank-
ing system. For example, as can be seen in Table 1, while in 1978 easily planned wages, sal-
ary payments and agricultural procurement accounted for 55.1% of all cash disbursements by 
state banks, this percentage dropped to 17.0% by 1995. In an economy of scarcity, the sales of 
consumer goods and services are easily determined by their (planned) avai lability; the share 
of sales of goods and services in all cash receipts of state banks dropped from 79.2 to 22.1% 
between 1978 and 1995. The share of the relatively unpredictable deposi ting and withdrawal 
                                                 
5 The only other source of financial resources is the state budget which provides all funding for investment in 
fixed assets as well as a certain amount of ―fixed-quota‖ working capital. The banking system supplements mea-
ger fixed-quota working capital allowances by extending short-term working capital loans in accordance with the 
commodity inventory system. 
6 The banking system, originally the monobank, then suppl emented meager fixed-quota working capital allow-
ances by extending short-term working capital loans in accordance with the commodity inventory system. 
7 The central government tried to maintain an upper limit on bonus payments by levying a steep bonus tax.  Bo-
nus payments equaling up to four months of wage and salary payments were free of tax, marginal bonus pa y-
ments equivalent to a fifth month of wage and salary payments carried a 30% tax, those equivalent to a sixth 
month of wage and salary payments a 100%  tax, and those exceeding the equivalent of six months‘ wage and 
salary payments a 300% tax. (SC 84/6/28) BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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of savings as share of total cash disbursements and receipts rose from 9.6% and 10.7% in 
1978 to 51.1% and 54.3% in 1995.
8 
 
Figure 2  Enterprise and Household Circuits after Reform (page 48) 
Table 1  Disbursements and Receipts of Cash by State Banks (page 54) 
 
 
The loss of control over the disbursements and receipts of cash was exacerbated by the illegal 
use of cash by enterprises for the purchase of producer goods in the enterprise circuit as well 
as for consumption by enterprises. (Enterprises and various state units would purchase con-
sumer goods for their employees, while formally adhering to the official wage and salary 
scales). The growth of the individual-owned economy and the rural township and village en-
terprises, with much of their transactions outside the banking system, further rendered the 
cash plan difficult to implement. Imbalances in the household circuit became more likely and 
could, by the late 1980s, with prices successively freed, lead to inflation in the consumer 
goods market. With rising household incomes and the threat of inflation, households now 
faced decisions on how much money to hold, and in what form (cash or deposits). Household 
money demand gradually became a meaningful concept.  
On the supply side, the need for active monetary policy arose. In the household cir-
cuit, monetary policy focused on withdrawing excess cash by setting appropriate, centrally 
determined, nationwide uniform interest rates on household deposits, even while monitoring 
of the cash plan and attempts at enforcing the cash plan continued. Between 1978 and 1999, 
these interest rates were adjusted eighteen times.
9  
In the enterprise circuit, with the expansion of enterprise-based decision-making and 
the growth of the non-state economy, the planning and production bureaucracy gradually lost 
control over physical transactions. The volume and distribution of transfer money began to 
matter in that excess transfer money could lead to imbalances in the real sphere. Beginning in 
1985, prices for producer goods were partially freed in the dual -track price system; by 1993, 
market-determined prices governed 81.1% of the value of all producer goods sale s.
10 Imbal-
ances in the producer goods sector could, furthermore, through the price of materials and the 
volume of wages and salaries, spill over into the consumer goods sector. Inflation b ecame a 
                                                 
8 See China Financial Statistics 1952-1987 and Statistical Yearbook 1999, p. 625. 
9 The PBC today still sets all interest rates, subject to State Council approval, at nationwide uniform levels (al-
beit some, nowadays, with a bandwidth). 
10 See Price Yearbook 1997, p. 482. Anne-Laure Delatte, Julien Fouquau and  
Carsten A. Holz 
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threat not only in the enterprise circuit but also in the hou sehold circuit, and it became in-
creasingly impossible to conduct monetary policy separately for the two circuits. A first bout 
of double-digit inflation in 1988-1989 led to panic purchases of consumer goods and the 
withdrawal of household savings deposits. The PBC responded by inflation-indexing house-
hold deposits (but not enterprise deposits) with maturities of three years and longer for the 
period 10 September 1988 to 1 December 1991.
11 
The need for active monetary policy in the enterprise circuit became u rgent. As the 
use of transfer money by enterprises had to be deregulated, it was the extension of  additional 
transfer money (credit) to individual enterprises which became central to monetary policy. 
The reduction in microeconomic control mechanisms in the real sphere (partial abandonment 
of the physical plan and of price controls) was compensated for by an elaborate credit plan 
system with earmarked loans for individual projects and enterprises. While loans were ex-
tended by financial institutions, many lending decisions were made outside the financial sys-
tem by the traditional planning and production hierarchy.  
The  financial  link  between  enterprises  and  government  finance  departments  was 
gradually severed. Enterprises making their own production decisions could no longer submit 
all surplus to the finance departments (or the enterprise‘s super ordinate government depart-
ments); a finance department receiving less funds could no longer provide enterprises with 
fixed-quota working capital and investment funds. In 1979, enterprises were allowed to retain 
funds through partial profit retention. A ‗tax instead of profit delivery‘ (ligaishui) reform fol-
lowed in 1983 through 1985 (and then was partly rescinded with the enterprise contract re-
sponsibility system in 1988-92). The task of providing all working capital and, newly, in-
vestment funds, shifted to the banking system in an effort to ‗switch from budget appropria-
tions to credit‘ (bogaidai). 
The changes in financial intermediation, with an increase in the volume and a diver-
sification in the type of banking business, led to institutional changes in the financial sector. 
Four ―special banks‖ re-emerged from departments within the PBC and the central Finance 
Ministry.  These  ―special  banks,‖  later  relabed  ―state  banks‖  and  then  ―state  commercial 
banks,‖ joined the small Bank of Communications and the rural credit cooperatives to form 
China‘s group of financial intermediaries. Other financial institutions were to follow, in par-
                                                 
11 A second period of inflation-indexing began on 11 July 1993, with the inflation subsidy dropping to zero in 
May 1997. See Jinrong shibao 97/10/28 and 99/12/6, Finance Yearbook 1997, p. 493, and Statistical Yearbook 
1998, p. 533.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 27/ 2011 
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ticular nationwide other commercial banks and regional commercial banks starting in the late 
1980s. The state commercial banks held 85%% of all deposits in China in 1985 (with the re-




B  The rise and fall of the credit plan system  
 
With the gradual decline of output planning starting in the early 1980s, new macroeconomic 
control instruments were needed. This led to the creation of an elaborate credit plan system 
which translated macroeconomic targets into microeconomic lending decisions. Officially, it 
remained in place until the late 1990s. The system of credit plans consisted of a credit plan for 
each state commercial bank and a PBC (Refinancing) Credit Plan.
13 An attempt was made to 
draw up an overall State Comprehensive Credit Plan that covered all financial institutions, but 
financial institutions other than the four state commercial banks were probably never effe c-
tively subjected to anything more than an annual lending limit. 
In 1984-86, banks faced both a credit and a deposit plan with refinancing of the dif-
ference guaranteed by higher-level branches of the same bank and ultimately  by the central 
bank. Deposits attracted in excess of the deposit plan could be freely turned into working 
capital loans by the bank branch itself (duocun duodai). This created incentives for banks to 
attract more savings in order to lend more. The policy affected all aspects of the two circuits. 
In the household circuit, additional loans could pay for bonus payments to households (on top 
of the planned salary and wage payments). In the enterprise circuit, additional lending was no 
longer necessarily tied to the commodity inventory system (the linkage between loans and 
production), and money in the enterprise circuit thus no longer had a direct correspondence to 
production.  
In  1987,  refinancing  through  the  central  bank  became  no  longer  guaranteed—
financial institutions were to use the local/ regional interbank money market—and binding 
credit limits were instituted. Since 1989, the PBC no longer draws up deposit plans; these be-
                                                 
12 People’s Bank of China Quarterly Statistical Bulletin #4/2010, PBC website (www.pbc.gov.cn, accessed 15 
July 2011), Xinhua yuebao (relevant 1986 issue), China Financial Statistics 1949-2005. 
13 For details on the hierarchical organization of the credit plan of each financial institution, and the interlocking 
effects of the credit plans of the state commercial plans and that of the PBC, see Holz (1992). Almost every sin-
gle credit regulation available covers aspects of the credit plan. Some of the relevant regulations of the 1980s and 
early 1990s are PBC 8 Oct. 1984(a), PBC Oct. 1984, ICBC 8 Oct 1984, PBC 24 Dec. 1986, PBC 25 Ma rch 
1988, PBC 9 March 1989, PBC 12 Feb. 1990, PBC 8 Aug. 1990, PBC 19 Feb. 1992, PBC 11 Feb. 1993(c), PBC 
3 March 1993. Anne-Laure Delatte, Julien Fouquau and  
Carsten A. Holz 
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came the responsibility of the state commercial banks. In determining credit limits, the PBC 
was  to  first  determine  the  increase  in  money  supply  based  on  the  quantity  equ a-
tionconsidering next year‘s expected ―rational‖ economic growth, planned price increases 
and changes in the velocity of moneyand then to determine the credit volume accordingly. 
In the early years, refinancing of the state commercial banks by the PBC occurred predomi-
nantly at the provincial if not municipal level (to ensure that lending plans would be met), and 
the provincial PBC branch appeared to have the authority to determine part of financial insti-
tution‘s credit limits.
14 In 1994, all refinancing authority was centralized.
15    
The credit plan of a state commercial bank (branch) covered loans for investment in 
fixed assets and working capital loans. Loans for capital construction (one of two types of in-
vestment in fixed assets) were imperatively planned in terms of a year-end maximum as well 
as in terms of planned annual extension of such credit given repayment of old loans; these 
loans were typically imperatively allocated to individual projects. Loans for technological up-
dating and transformation (the second type of investment in fixed assets) were imper atively 
planned in terms of their total year-end provincial institution-specific volume only. Working 
capital loans became subject to an annual limit sometime in the second half of the 1980s. I.e., 
short-term loans (working capital loans) were much less ti ghtly regulated than loans for in-
vestment in fixed assets. 
In 1991, guidelines were issued on industries which enjoy priority in lending . Pro-
vincial governments were to organize banks and government departments to draw up prior i-
ties listing specific enterp rises and specific products.
16  In addition to lending guidelines, 
                                                 
14 With the PBC before 1984 serving as commercial bank, it had branches down to the county level. These 
branches were maintained after 1984 and seem to have been frequently misused by local governments; the PRC 
PBC Law of 1995 in Article 12 finally states explicitly that PBC branches on all levels are PBC agencies (paichu 
jigou), which means they are subordinate only to the next higher-level PBC branch. 
15 According to PBC 9 March 1989, provincial PBC branches may not extend any new loans to financial institu-
tions (this seems to exclude recycling of old loans), they may no longer ―adjust‖ various refinancing loans, and 
no longer enjoy the right to use part of the increases in budgetary deposits and post office savings deposits ex-
ceeding the plan to give locally determined refinancing loans. All deposits by central and local state budgets (i.e., 
the finance ministries on all tiers), local extra-budgetary deposits, deposits by state offices and organizations, 
capital construction deposits, special deposits, and reserves of financial institutions ―belong‖ to the PBC, with 
the PBC headquarters deciding on whether to share any of these funds with the provincial PBC branch. (PBC 8 
Oct. 1984(b)) At times when it does, the provincial PBC branch may then decide itself how to use these funds 
(for example, to support some local key project by extending a loan through one of the state commercial banks). 
For details on the evolution of the credit plan system, see a host of credit regulations issued around that time, 
such as PBC 24 Dec. 1986, PBC Dec. 1986(a,b), and PBC 24 Feb. 1989. 
16 Establishment of such priorities seems to follow the reforms in the real sp here where a ―sectoral policy‖ is 
supposed to facilitate approval procedures by planning commissions of investment projects. The State Council 
passed a ―decision on the main points of the present sectoral policy‖ on 15 March 1989 and an ―outline of the BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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banks also faced explicit external decisions on policy loans.
17   According  to  Montes -
Negret (1995, p. 31), the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China in the early 1990s could 
autonomously decide on less than 20% of its lending. Xiao (1997, p. 371) reports that a p-
proximately 40% of all state bank loans in 1991 were ―policy loans‖ (defined in the source as 
particular lending categories),
18 while Hui (1994) claims that 20% of all Industrial and Com-
mercial Bank of China loans are policy loans; for the Agricultural Bank of China the share is 
30%, for the Bank of China 15%, and for the Construction Bank of China  45%. And yet, by 
1993 banks were explicitly encouraged to refuse loans to projects which are not economically 
viable (PBC 11 Feb. 1993(c)). 
In 1993, after numerous scandals in the financial system, many related to trust and 
investment companies set up by provinces, Zhu Rongji became governor of the PBC (and was 
concurrently, since 1991, deputy  prime minister). A number of financial sector reforms 
emerged. At the core was a financial sector reform decision passed by the State Council on 25 
December 1993. It states that the PBC‘s intermediate and operational targets are money sup-
ply, credit volume, interbank money market rate, and a ―safety deposit requirement.‖ Starting 
1994, the state commercial banks were to adopt prudential ratios.
19 A number of institutional 
reforms followed, including the establishment of three policy banks to take over the po licy 
loans of the state commercial banks, the passing of the PBC Law and the Commercial Bank 
Law in May 1995, the consolidation of provincial -level PBC branches into nine regional 
branches in October 1998, and the allocation of budgetary funds to take bad loans off the bal-
ance sheets of the state commercial banks starting in the second half of the 1990s, culminating 
in the establishment of asset management companies in 1999 to take over  all remaining bad 
loans of the state commercial banks. 
                                                                                                                                                         
state sectoral policy for the 1990s‖ on 25 March 1994. For the monetary aspects see, for example, PBC 11 Sept. 
1991 and PBC 11 Feb. 1993(a). 
17 What constitutes a ―policy loan?‖ The term appears to have two usages. Policy loans can denote certain cate-
gories of loans which are extended at especially low interest rates, such as loans to commercial departments for 
the purchase of agricultural and sideline products (with not necessarily any reference to individual projects). 
―Policy loans‖ can also denote the extent to which a bank‘s (or bank branch‘s) loan quota is exhausted by pro-
jects determined individually at a higher administrative level within the bank or by the local government (with 
not necessarily any reference to an interest rate). 
18 These loans range from the loans extended to 240 enterprises under the ―double-guarantee system‖ (the state 
guarantees all inputs, the enterprise guarantees all outputs) with no decision-making authority for the bank, to 
agricultural procurement loans for which the government only determines volume and purpose (Xiao, 1997). Not 
all policy loans are explicitly labeled ―policy loans.‖ Local governments and lower-level tier government de-
partments are participating in, if not making, some loan decisions; financial intermediaries may not want to lend 
to enterprises which do not have borrowing approval from their superordinate ministry. Anne-Laure Delatte, Julien Fouquau and  
Carsten A. Holz 
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Even though the 1993 reform decision mentioned money supply targeting and the 
adoption of prudential ratios, by 1995, the then highly centralized credit plan was still very 
much relevant. The national economic and social development plan of 1995 (NPC 18 March 
1995a) reported only one monetary target for 1995: this was the total increase in bank credit, 
by no more than 570b yuan (with quarter-by-quarter limits for individual banks). Prudential 
ratios were not enforced for many years to come.
20  
The switch to money supply tar geting officially occurred in the second half of the 
1990s. The South China Morning Post on 1 February 1996 reported Chinese growth targets 
for M1 and M2 in 1996 of 18% and 25%. The 1998 national economic and social develop-
ment plan stated that credit limits on lending by the state commercial banks have now ended. 
It does not report any monetary targets for 1998, except an increase in currency in circulation 
of 150b yuan (NPC, 6 March 1998). The 1999 national economic and social development 
plan for the first time issued M1 and M2 growth targets, for 1999, of ―approximately‖ 14% 
and 14-15% (NPC 6 March 1999).  
The relative late transition from credit limits to money supply targeting suggests that 
in the early reform years it was difficult to accurately predict movements of the money multi-
plier between base money and money supply in response to all the ongoing reforms in the real 
and the financial sphere. That would also hint at difficulties in establishing a stable money 
demand function. In terms of monetary tools, it appears that only in the second half of the 
2000s has the PBC adopted routine open market operations, presumably largely in response to 
capital inflows, and has begun to frequently change the reserve requirements. 
The 2000s also saw a number of institutional changes with WTO accession in 2002 
and the gradual opening of China‘s financial sector to foreign financial institutions, the estab-
lishment of the China Banking Regulatory Commission in April 2003 (leaving the PBC pri-
marily with monetary policy tasks), capital injections by the state into the four state commer-
cial banks and their public listing in 2005 (Construction Bank of China, and the Bank of 
Communications, not one of the four ―state commercial banks‖ but a state-owned bank, nev-
ertheless), 2006 (Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China), and 2010 (Agri-
                                                                                                                                                         
19 In 1989 the PBC started a deposit safety requirement (cunkuan beifujin) of 5-7%, allegedly to guarantee that 
deposits can be withdrawn any time. This requirement seems to not have been strict and appears to have come to 
be included with excess reserves. (PBC 9 March 1989) 
20 Money supply data appeared for the first time in 1993,  in the back pages of the PBC‘s monthly magazine 
Zhongguo jinrong, together with all other quarterly financial statistics. The People’s Bank of China Quarterly 
Statistical Bulletin, which started publication in 1996, carries retrospectively created data on M1 beginning with 
March 1990. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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cultural Bank of China), exchange rate liberalization starting in 2005, and the transitioning of 
the three state development banks from banks with policy lending tasks into solely develop-
ment banks. 
While the credit plan system has never been officially dismantled, the underlying 
loan classification system has been abandoned—loans are now classified by maturity, and not 
by type (capital construction loans, etc.)—and whatever lending limits and loan allocations 
are in place are now, presumably, determined bank-internally. Nevertheless, credit limits re-
surface at unusual times, such as in early 2010, when the head of the China Banking Regula-
tory Commission, Liu Mingkang, said that overall credit growth in 2010 will be restricted to 
7.5 trillion yuan.
21 
There also remains a question as to how effective the credit plan has been in limiting 
the overall amount of loans. Figure 3, showing the credit plan lending limits of 1983-1995 and 
the actual amount of loans extended, suggests that the credit plan has had only limited su c-
cess. This adds an interesting twist: if the credit plan was never a rigorous control instrument, 
then a standard money demand equation adopted from market economies could well be appli-
cable to China even in the early reform period.  
 
Figure 3  State Banks: Planned vs. Actual Change in Credit (page 49) 
 
A counterargument to the increasing relevance over time of concepts of money demand as 
applied to market economies could be that what has replaced the two circuits in China is not 
so much a market-based money demand function, as an infinite demand for money at prevail-
ing interest rates. This argument would be supported by the relatively low (and sometimes 
negative) real interest rates (Figure 4). The actual volume of money is then determined solely 
by the supply of money, which in turn is directly related to the volume of loans.
22 In other 
words, China until today does not have a meaningful demand for money.  This is a central 
question we will address in the empirical section.  
 
Figure 4  Lending Rate and CPI (page 50) 
                                                 
21 http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=asj.kLMqwSvE, accessed 12 July 2011. 
22 Xu (1998), for example, finds that loans have strong explanatory power in his money demand functions, a l-
though he stops short of viewing it as an unlimited demand with limited supply issue. Anne-Laure Delatte, Julien Fouquau and  
Carsten A. Holz 
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III  Dataset and data properties 
 
A  Dataset 
 
Our data are obtained from a wide variety of sources. We work with quarterly and monthly 
data to obtain quarterly series. When only monthly data are available, these are aggregated 
into quarterly data. In the case of stock rather than flow values, our quarterly values are mid-
quarter values, obtained as the arithmetic average of end-period and beginning-period values. 
We collected data starting with the year 1978, but then start our analysis with the year 1984 
because data on some series are not available for the earlier years. Below is a brief summary 
of data sources and data manipulations. A lengthy documentation is available upon request. 
All data used are plotted in Figure 5.  
Deposit and loan data are obtained from the monthly magazine Xinhua yuebao for 
the years through 1985, the financial statistics page in the PBC‘s monthly magazine Zhong-
guo  jinrong  for  the  years  1986-1989,  China  Financial  Statistics  1949-2005  for  the  years 
1990-2005,  and  the  PBC  Quarterly  Statistical  Bulletin  and  the  PBC  website 
(http://www.pbc.gov.cn/)  for  the  years  since  2006.  The  transitions  between  the  different 
sources are not always smooth: minor adjustment to loan data were required for 1988 and 
1989. 
The sources of money supply data for M0 are the same as for deposits and loans. 
Quarterly M1 data for the years through 1990 are obtained from the International Monetary 
Fund‘s International Financial Statistics (IFS); since then, they are obtained from the PBC 
Quarterly Statistical Bulletin and the PBC website.  
Interest rates are obtained from the Finance Yearbook and, for 2009 and 2010, from 
individual announcements on the PBC website. In contrast to the IFS, which seems to use 
end-month values, we calculate average monthly interest rates (and then average quarterly 
interest rates).
23 We take into consideration that interest rates on household time deposits (but 
not on enterprise time deposits) of 3-year or longer duration were inflation-indexed from 10 
September 1988 through 1 December 1991, and then again starting 11 July 1993. The spread 
between U.S. and China‘s lending rates is the percentage point difference between the U.S. 
Bank Prime Loan Rate and the China lending rate, both series as published in the IFS. 
                                                 
23 The average monthly interest rate is the arithmetic mean of the daily interest rates, and the average quarterly 
interest rate is the arithmetic mean of the monthly interest rates. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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Exchange rate data are obtained from the ISF through 1986, and then from the Fi-
nance Yearbook and the PBC website. The nominal effective exchange rate and the real effec-
tive exchange rate are obtained from the IFS. 
For data on the real economy, our default source is a series of three statistical maga-
zines published by the National Bureau of Statistics: Zhongguo tongji yuebao (July 1985 – 
1989), China Statistics Monthly (1988 – early 1990s), and China Monthly Statistics (starting 
early 1990s). We also resort to the statistics page in the NBS monthly magazine Zhongguo 
tongji and to the NBS website (www.stats.gov.cn). For the numerous manipulations involved 
in the creation of quarterly GDP, industrial output, and investment series, we conducted ex-
tensive reliability checks before proceeding as we did. 
The CPI and the retail price index are published as a monthly year-on-year (yoy) 
growth rate. We create a price index by setting all monthly CPI (and retail price index) values 
of the year 2002 equal to 100, and then applying the published CPI (and retail price index) 
growth rates to this base in order to obtain a continuous index that covers the complete time 
period. From this continuous index we obtain quarterly yoy growth rates.
24 
The retail sales data had a number of missing data points which then required some 
(minor) approximations. The raw GDP data are from the  China Quarterly GDP Time Series 
1992-2005 and the NBS website. Quarterly values for the years prior to 1992 are obtained by 
relying on the quarterly proportions of the industrial output data. All final quarterly GDP data 
are based on the most recently revised annual GDP series (from the Statistical Yearbook 2010 
and the Statistical Abstract 2011) to which the quarterly GDP shares of the raw GDP data 
(prior to 1992 industrial output values) are applied. We create a real series by taking all four 
quarterly nominal values of 2002 to also be real values. 
Industrial output values are based on the available real and nominal data on gross 
output value, sales output value, and value-added, for whichever aggregate of industry these 
data are available (total; directly reporting industrial enterprises, with its changing definition). 
In addition to the default sources, we consulted the PBC Quarterly Statistical Bulletin. From 
these raw data, we create a monthly yoy real growth index. We also use these series to deter-
mine the share of each month or quarter in annual output. Data in levels are based on the an-
                                                 
24 We can equally well obtain quarterly yoy growth rates from the published monthly yoy growth rates. The dif-
ference between these two series is exceedingly small. Because we obtain real series of other variables by using 
2002 as the base year, we take the same approach for the price indices. The choice of 2002 followed careful ex-
amination of the price indices in all years. 2002 was a year with average monthly CPI inflation of -0.8% (and a 
standard deviation of 0.3 percentage points) and it followed two years of near-stable prices. Anne-Laure Delatte, Julien Fouquau and  
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nual industrial valued added published in the national income accounts (Statistical Yearbook 
2010 and the Statistical Abstract 2011) to which these monthly or quarterly shares are ap-
plied. A series of real value added is obtained by taking all 2002 nominal values to also be 
real values, and then applying the earlier derived real growth rates to the 2002 base (which 
can then also be readily used to back out a quarterly yoy growth rate series).
25 
The investment data are based on the economy-wide annual investment values pub-
lished in the  Statistical Yearbook, to  which monthly or quarterly shares  are  applied. The 
monthly or quarterly shares are based on a large variety of different investment data available 
at different points in time (capital construction and technological updating and transformation, 
investment by state-owned units, urban investment). 
Household income is limited to urban household income in 35 or 36 cities (with the 
exact number of cities depending on year). Our default variable is disposable income, our 
second choice is living expenditures. A real series is obtained by deflating with the CPI (using 
2002 as the base year). 
 
 
Figure 5  Selection of data (in billion Yuan, current prices if not mentioned otherwise) (page 51) 
 
 
B  Data properties 
 
We need to check the integration order of our series. Although this step is standard, we need 
to be very cautious given their statistical properties. In particular, some series obviously ex-
hibit seasonal characteristics, an issue that has been overlooked in previous studies (see Fig-
ure 5). In fact, prefiltering seasonal series by seasonal dummies assumes that seasonality is 
only a deterministic phenomenon, which has important drawbacks in the presence of stochas-
tic seasonality. The alternative filtering with an ARIMA X-12 procedure, accounts for sto-
chastic seasonality but assumes stationarity. In sum, filters alter the stochastic structure of se-
ries because they impose a particular stochastic structure (Franses, 1997). Unit root tests on 
linear seasonal filtered data tend to over-reject the null hypothesis of a unit root.  
To address this issue, we apply a seasonal unit-root test developed by Hylleberg et al 
(1990) (HEGY) that has the advantage of testing for unit roots at zero frequency (long run 
                                                 
25 The issue of two series of quarterly yoy real growth rates is the same as in the case of the price indices. See the 
previous footnote. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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behavior) and for seasonal unit roots. To do so, the tests decompose a quarterly series y into 




where L is the lag operator. The value of  (i=1 to 4) determines the existence of a unit root in 
the different frequencies. To check the significance of  , the test proceeds as a standard ADF 
test with critical values simulated by Hylleberg et al (1990). If  , the variable has one 
non-seasonal (long run) unit root. If, in addition,  (i=2 to 4) = 0 then the variable has also a 
seasonal unit root. It corresponds to a unit root in the semi-annual frequency if   and in 
the quarterly frequency if   which implies a joint F-test. In sum, this test allows us 
to identify the frequency at which the data have a unit root.  
Table 2 reports HEGY test and standard unit root tests. For all tests we have to spec-
ify the number of lagged difference terms of the dependent variable to be added to the test re-
gression. The usual advice is to include a number of lags sufficient to remove serial correla-
tion in the residuals. 
 
Table 2  Standard and Seasonal Unit Root Tests (page 55) 
 
First, the HEGY test identifies which variable has a unit root in the zero-frequency, which is a 
pre-requirement to study a cointegration relationship. The test reveals that the following vari-
ables are stationary: cash (   household deposits, real growth of disposable income, infla-
tion, real 5-year-fixed-term deposit interest rate, real growth rate of industrial output, invest-
ment, US vs. China Interest rate spread. The rest of the variables are nonstationary: GDP, in-
dustrial output, total loans, short-term loans, M1, retail sales, CPI index, household disposable 
income, living expenditures.  
The standard tests ADF, PP or KPSS yield similar conclusions as HEGY tests in the 
zero frequency, with the exception of cash (M0). In fact, we find that m0 is stationary in the 
zero-frequency but has a unit root in the semi-annual frequency. It means that every year the 
variable has different characteristics (such as volume) in the first half of the year from the 
second half. It is possibly due to Chinese New Year, when households conduct more pur-
chases than at other times of the year, with the excess currency in circulation later withdrawn Anne-Laure Delatte, Julien Fouquau and  
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by the PBC, and when household give newly printed money as present. This result suggests 
that the standard tests wrongly reject the variable‘s stationarity because of the presence of a 
seasonal unit root.  
Second, the HEGY test shows the stochastic seasonal characteristics. The variables 
GDP, retail sales and CPI index are found to have a unit root in the zero-frequency and semi-
annual frequency ( . The variable industrial output has a unit-root both in the zero-
frequency and quarterly frequency ( ) with a Fisher test.  
Now that we have identified the frequency in which the data have unit root (s), we 
use this information to filter the data. If the series has only a unit root in the zero-frequency 
and no seasonal unit root, we use this variable in levels. If the series has a zero-frequency unit 
root and a seasonal unit root, we cannot use the standard procedure of Engle and Granger 
(1987). To focus only on the long run relationship, we eliminate the seasonal unit root and 
keep only the unit root in the zero-frequency. More precisely, we work with seasonal compo-
nent S1=   as in Engle, Granger, Hylleberg and Lee (1993). With this 
component, we can use the traditional cointegration test. 
Given the proper treatment of seasonality and integration order of the series, we con-
tinue with stationary and non- stationary series to examine the linear empirical specification.  
 
 
IV   Linear Specifications 
 
In a market economy, economic agents choose the level of money to balance between their 
transaction motives and the opportunity cost of holding money. In the case of China, other 
arguments specific to its institutional background may have shaped money demand. In the 
following, we present a total of five hypothetical motives that may plausibly to determine 
money demand. To do justice to the origins of China‘s current monetary system, we analyze 
money demand in China using the concept of the two circuits before moving on to M1, the 
monetary aggregate of the market economy.  
 
 BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 27/ 2011 
 
 
  25 
A  Five Hypotheses  
 
The first and obvious explanation of money demand is the transactions motive. Second, in a 
transition economy, the transaction motive goes with a monetization trend. As Xu (1998) ex-
plains, monetization has two aspects: monetary transactions replace nonmarket activities, and 
more market transactions are conducted with cash rather than settled through bank transfers. 
The first aspect implies an increasing volume of monetary transactions affecting all monetary 
aggregates, while the second aspect implies a higher degree of cash use relative to some pro-
duction or sales value. Monetization implies a drastic increase in money demand in the early 
stages of reform that levels off progressively over time.  
A third potential explanation is complementarity. Mc Kinnon‘s (1973) complemen-
tarity argument runs that in developing economies with limited access by households and 
small enterprises to external finance, money is accumulated to self-finance investment. In-
vestment and bank deposits are not substitutes, but complements. The complementarity hy-
pothesis holds if the demand for money is positively correlated with the real return on capital.  
In the case of China, the argument has two facets. (i) If investment happens accord-
ing to plan and the state makes the funding available (either through the budget or the state 
banking system), as was the case probably through at least the mid-1990s, there is no com-
plementarity. (ii) For private and collective-owned enterprises with limited access to bank 
loans, complementarity may be relevant. The share of own funds in total funding of invest-
ment in fixed assets in China has been invariably high at around 50%, with a slight upward 
trend, which could suggest that despite the availability of bank loans for at least some enter-
prises, complementarity may have a role to play.
26  
Fourth, once the straightjacket of the plan was relaxed and investment opportunities 
arose and the possibility of inflation appeared, the opportunity cost of holding of money b e-
came relevant. All household deposits in China bear interest.  Current account deposits come 
with the lowest interest rates. Only savings deposits of three years maturity or longer enjoyed 
inflation-indexed interest rates at times of high inflation.  The effect of inflation on money 
holdings is complex. A high rate of  inflation can imply a high opportunity cost to holding 
cash or maintaining high balances in checking accounts, i.e., lead to reduced cash holdings. 
But a high rate of inflation can also induce households to desire a higher degree of liquidity, 
                                                 
26 In 1993, the first year for which the data are available, own funds accounted for 47% of all funding for capital 
construction and technological updating and transformation (with no data available on total investment in fixed 
assets); in 2009, own funds accounted for 61% of all funding of investment in fixed assets (Statistical Yearbook). Anne-Laure Delatte, Julien Fouquau and  
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because they need more money to purchase a given amount of goods or services at the now 
higher prices. It can also signal to households that the government is losing control and that it 
is a safer bet to reduce savings deposits and purchase available consumer goods and services 
before inflation rises even further (a view that is supposed to have prevailed in the late 1980s, 
a period marked by ―panic purchases‖).  
Fifth, one argument that is always looming in the background, as elaborated above, is 
to what extent does China have a meaningful demand for money rather than an infinite de-
mand for money at the state-determined prevailing interest rate, constrained only by supply? 
As argued in the section on institutions, the volume of loans was a major monetary instrument 
to try and control money holdings in the economy. Therefore, we will test whether the volume 
of loans is a significant fourth determinant of money holdings. If among all relevant regres-
sors only credit is significant, we would conclude that money holdings are determined by the 
volume of credit.  




where   represent the different monetary aggregates identified in the institutional analysis 
and   is a stationary error term.  
 
 
B  The Household Circuit 
 
We explore the household circuit through the determinants of the demand for cash and house-
hold deposits in the banking system. Lacking a concise breakdown of household deposits by 
maturity for the complete reform period, and since all deposits earned interest, we operate 
with one aggregate of household deposits. 
In the pre-reform period, a rule of thumb used by the planning authorities was that 
one yuan of currency in circulation is sufficient for eight yuan worth of retail sales transac-
tions per year.
27 In the pre-reform period, household deposits constituted a small residual (of 
wages and salaries over retail sales) in the household circuit. This residual was periodica lly 
                                                 
27 See China Aktuell, no. 9 (1984), p 525. With retail sales constituting the main channel trough which currency 
in circulation returned to the state banks, and wages and salaries being the main channel through which currency 
entered circulation, the government could use the 1:8 equation to calculate the increase in retail goods supply 
needed if wage and salary payments were raised by a certain percentage.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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absorbed by the banking system, mainly in the course of savings campaigns as the low inter-
est rates provided few incentives to save. If wages and salaries increased, all else constant, 
household deposits may have increased; similarly, if retails sales dropped, all else constant, 
household deposits may also have increased.  
Economic reforms would suggest increasingly autonomous household decisions on 
the allocation of their money balances. Yet the seasonal unit-root tests in Table 2revealed that 
cash (m0) and household deposits are stationary. By definition, stationarity means that they 
both have a constant mean and variance. In other words, the two aggregates vary steadily 
along an upward trend. This property suggests that they are planned rather than the result of 
free rational choice, which would imply a random walk: household deposits did not turn into a 
function of the opportunity cost to holding non-interest bearing forms of money. In sum, 
household shave an infinite demand for money at prevailing interest rates. 
This finding is possibly due to the fact that the interest rate is lower than the market 
interest rate. With the PBC (and the SC) setting nationwide interest rates (gradually switching 
to bands for some lending rates), there is no market interest rate. The only comparison one 
can make is with the inflation rate. Figure 4 shows that lending rates until 1995 indeed were 
relatively low, except for a few years around 1990, and often negative in real terms. Only 
since 1997 has the real lending rate been mostly positive, though it remained relatively low. In 
the household circuit, the low interest rate has probably allowed the continued enforcement of 
the cash administration regulations, issued in 1977 and revised in 1988.
28 Reminders to adhere 
to the regulations were issued in other years. As recently as in mid -1997, the Agricultural 
Bank of China prided itself on having strictly adhered to the cash disburs ement plan in the 
first half of the year.
29  
This first finding is important because it statistically confirms a persistent control by 
the state over household decision on money holdings allocation. Our finding may be surpri s-
ing in that two out of three standard stationary tests (mis)conclude that m0 is non-stationary—
this underlines the importance of properly accounting for seasonality to disentangle seasonal 
peaks from a pure random walk, which the standard stationary tests cannot do.  
 
 
                                                 
28 See SC 28 Oct. 1977, SC 8 Sept. 1988, and PBC 12 Sept. 1988. 
29 See Zhongguo chengxiang jinrongbao, 21 July 1997. Anne-Laure Delatte, Julien Fouquau and  
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C  The enterprise circuit 
 
Contrary to what we find in the household circuit, enterprise deposits are non-stationary (see 
Table 2). It is a first indication that economic reforms implied increasingly autonomous enter-
prise decisions. In the pre-reform economy, enterprise deposits were simply a reflection of the 
commodity inventory system; they depended on production. In the reform period, even the 
state-owned enterprises have become highly profit-oriented and ceased enjoying a soft budget 
constraint. As a consequence enterprises gradually gained decision-making authority on their 
deposits.  
Therefore, we can test the inclusion of different hypothetical determinants in a coin-
tegrating vector. The top half of Table 3—based on equation (1) and the explanations in the 
section on the five hypotheses above —summarizes the explanatory variables we will use to 
capture our hypotheses in the enterprise circuit. 
 
Table 3  Explanatory Variables (page 56) 
 
In order to check the robustness of our results, we try different alternative variables to capture 
our hypotheses. For example, as deposits came to fund not only production but also invest-
ment, the transaction motive is captured alternatively with the nominal industrial production 
and with investment
30. To be consistent with the transaction motive, the monetization trend is 
the same squared variable (industrial production or investment).  The complementarity hy-
pothesis runs that deposits are positively related with the real return on capital, proxied with 
two alternative variables, the real growth rate of industrial output and the real 5 -year deposit 
interest rate. Two different interest rates are included to test the opportunity cost hypothesis. 
Lastly, the effect of the credit plan constraint is tested with the intro duction of short-term 
loans, a maturity specific to the production sector.  
Proceeding to the cointegration tests, the research question of this paper is the stabil-
ity of money demand in China. More precisely we focus only on the long term relationship to 
test whether it is time-varying. Therefore, for the linear specification, cointegration tests rely 
on Engle and Granger (1987) tests using Phillips and Ouliaris (1990) critical values. 
The results are presented in Table 4 (The term ―included‖ denotes variables initially 
included in a vector in which cointegration was rejected; a Schwartz criterion is used to select 
the optimal cointegration relationship).  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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Table 4  Linear Demand for Money in the Enterprise Circuit (page 57) 
 
First, regarding the transaction motive, cointegration is rejected when investment is used as a 
transaction variable (all spec 3), while almost always accepted when the nominal industrial 
output is used (spec 1a, 2a and 2b). It means that the proper variable to proxy corporate 
spending is the nominal industrial output. In addition, the monetization trend is significant and 
positive (spec 1a, 2a and 2b). This result confirms that deposits have been increasingly used 
for settling transactions. The fact that the estimated monetization coefficient is close to zero 
implies that monetization does not level off towards the end of the period. It means that the 
monetization process is not yet completed in this circuit. In fact, the growth of money bal-
ances decreases relatively to the volume of transactions when agents use other assets than de-
posits as a store of value. But as we will see in the next paragraph, we find that money is 
complementary to capital in China. As a result, agents have less incentive to economize on 
deposits.  
To test the complementarity hypothesis, we proceed with two variables. When we 
use the real 5-year deposit interest rate as a proxy for the real return of capital, it is cointe-
grated but negatively correlated with enterprise deposits (spec1a). The negative sign cannot be 
interpreted as a complementarity effect because the complementarity hypothesis holds only if 
the correlation is positive. It probably acts more as a measure of opportunity cost, playing out 
in addition to the interest rate already included in the regression. When we switch to the real 
growth of industrial output as a measure to test the complementarity hypothesis, it turns out to 
be positively cointegrated with enterprise deposits, which means that money demand is af-
fected by a complementarity effect (spec 2a and 2b). More precisely, money finances invest-
ment projects, a result which is consistent with the high share of own funds in total funding of 
investment in fixed assets in China. 
Fourth, regarding the opportunity cost,  enterprise deposits  and both  interest  rates 
cointegrate with a negative sign and similar coefficients (spec 2a and 2b). It means that enter-
prise have an opportunity cost of holding money.  
Fifth, regarding the credit plan, the existence of a cointegration vector including only 
enterprise deposits and short-term loans is strongly rejected, which precludes any argument of 
purely state-determined money holdings (specification 4). However, when other determinants 
are included, enterprise deposits cointegrate positively with short term loans (spec 1a, 2a and 
                                                                                                                                                         
30 We do not include both variables in the same vector to avoid collinearity issue.  Anne-Laure Delatte, Julien Fouquau and  
Carsten A. Holz 
Explaining money demand in China during the transition  




  30 
2b). In a market economy, loans are cointegrated to deposits because loans are funded with 
bank deposits. However the existence of the credit plan suggests the opposite d irection: the 
volume of loans determines deposits. We can check if we find a cointegrated and significant 
relationship when credit is the dependent variable. If there were a cointegration vector when 
credit is explained by enterprise deposits (plus other variables) then we cannot have a clear-
cut conclusion on which variable affects the other. As it turns out, enterprise deposits are not a 
significant explanatory variable for short term credit: the existence of a cointegration vector is 
systematically rejected.
31 In contrast, the short-term loan variable is a significant cointegrated 
explanatory variable to enterprise deposits (spec 1a, 2a and 2b). This result suggests a persi s-
tent effectiveness of the credit plan over money holdings during the p eriod of estimation. In 
order to discriminate between specifications 2a and 2b, we use the standard Schwartz criterion 
which leads us to select specification 2a (-4.6 vs. -4.5 respectively). 
To summarize, the linear results confirm that economic reforms implied increasingly 
autonomous enterprise decisions regarding their deposits. Deposits came to fund production 
and demand for transaction balances has accelerated because of monetization during the r e-
form period. The opportunity costs of holding money began to matter. The significance of the 
credit variable suggests that state-owned enterprise deposits were probably determined by the 
credit plan. In turn, as the non-state sector expanded and credit from the banking sector  was 
no longer guaranteed, the complementarity hypothesis  gained ground: non-state enterprises 
saved in order to accumulate the funds necessary for investment. 
 
 
D  Aggregate money demand (M1) 
 
The gradual abandonment of the concept of two circuits by policy makers has progressively 
created space for a more standard analysis of aggregate money demand. Therefore, we test the 
five hypothetical determinants in the demand for aggregate money to verify to what extent 
aggregate money holdings have been supply-determined. The bottom half of Table 3 summa-
rizes the variables we use to capture the hypotheses in the standard monetary aggregate M1.  
As previously, we check the robustness of our results by testing several alternative 
specifications. We include five different standard measures of opportunity cost to compare 
with previous studies (Laurens and Maino, 2007, Bahmani-Oskoee and Wang 2007, Mehrotra 
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2006, Hafer and Kutan, 1994). When cointegration holds, we eliminate non-significant vari-
ables and we select the final specifications using a Schwartz criterion.  
The estimations results are presented in Table 5. First, regarding the transaction mo-
tive, we find that the GDP is significantly cointegrated to M1 with a similar coefficient in all 
specifications. Second, the monetization trend (squared GDP) is significant and close to zero, 
as in the enterprise circuit.  
Third, regarding the complementarity hypothesis, cointegration is rejected between 
the real five-year interest rate and M1 (all specifications 3 and 4). However, we find strong 
cointegration evidence whenever the real growth of industrial output is included (all specifica-
tions 1 and 2 except specification 1d). The positive relationship between aggregate money 
holdings and the real return of capital suggests that money and capital are complementary, i.e. 
money is accumulated before investment projects can be undertaken.  
Fourth, regarding the opportunity cost, all different interest rates negatively cointe-
grate with M1, which suggests an opportunity cost effect (all specifications 1 and 2 except 
1d). In turn, the spread between the Chinese and the US interest rate does not act as an oppor-
tunity cost, which is not surprising given the capital controls in China (specification 1d). Fifth, 
regarding the credit plan, the variable short-term loan is found not significant in three out of 
four specifications (specifications 1a, 1b, 1e). Therefore we proceed with the estimation ex-
cluding this variable. Our preferred specification is 2a, which minimizes the Schwartz crite-
rion. 
 
Table 5  Linear Demand for M1 (pages 58-59) 
 
To conclude the linear investigation, our institutional approach and original dataset yield new 
findings that allow a better understanding of the monetary sphere in China. First, the disag-
gregate approach points to the fact that autonomous decision-making on money has gained 
ground in the production sector only. The stationarity of household money holdings suggests 
that there is still significant state control over households‘ allocation choice. Second, we find 
a significant role of the credit plan in the enterprise circuit but no significant effect in the 
monetary aggregate. This finding may help to settle the debate about the credit plan‘s effi-
ciency over the period: the state appears to have been able to influence money holdings of the 
state-owned-enterprises, which is reflected in the circuit estimation, but the effect cannot be 
detected at the aggregate level. In addition, our results identify that the main motivation of Anne-Laure Delatte, Julien Fouquau and  
Carsten A. Holz 
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holding money is to finance investment, a determinant that was neglected in previous studies. 
This effect holds in the disaggregate as well as in the aggregate spheres, which underlines its 
importance in explaining money holdings. This new finding is consistent with the high share 
of own funds in total funding of investment. In this sense, the Chinese economy shares a 
common pattern with most emerging economies due to the absence of deep financial markets 
(Pentecost and Moore, 2006). Lastly, our specification confirms the monetization process that 
occurred in the different circuits.  
To what extent do the monetary aggregates of the planned economy exhibit stable re-
lationships to other economic variables? And how sustained are these relationships over time? 
To answer, we will explore whether the weight of the different determinants in the linear rela-
tionship have changed during the period of estimation or not.  
 
 
V  Non linear tests and estimation procedures 
 
A    Non linear specification 
 
We examine the time evolution of the different relationships (Eq. 1). To do so, we estimate a 
general specification of money holdings with a Time-Varying cointegration Smooth Transi-
tion Regression model (TV cointegration STR). This model allows us to relax the restricting 




where   is a zero-mean stationary error term and   is a continuous transition func-
tion bounded between 0 to 1 that only affects the variable  . More precisely, here 
the coefficient of the variable   is allowed to vary with time T. We adopt  a 
smooth transition function, and more particularly the standard logistic function of order 1: 
 
                             (3) 
 
This function has an S-shape (Figure 6). The   parameter determines the smoothness, i.e. the 
speed of the transition from one regime to the other. The higher, the value of the   parameter, 
the faster (i.e sharper) the transition. This function allows a smooth transition between "ex-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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treme regimes" defined by the coefficients   and  . There is an infinite number of 
intermediate  regimes  in  between  defined  as  a  weighted  average  of  the  parameters 
( ). For example, if we find that the estimated coefficient   is negative, 
it means that the absolute value of opportunity cost is greater than at the beginning of the pe-
riod. To simplify the presentation, Eq. (3) is a particular specification where the transition 
function only affects one explanatory variable. Of course it is possible to extend its impact to 
all explanatory variables. In the estimation, we allow all coefficients to vary with time, so that 
we are able verify the different hypotheses of the institutional background and their evolution. 
The intuition is the following: the disbandment of the two circuits has progressively created 
space for a more standard analysis of aggregate money demand. The transition has been grad-
ual. The institutional analysis allowed us to identify the main evolutionary trends during the 
transition period. Finally our estimation should help us to provide a functional form of the 
transition towards a standard money demand relationship. 
 
Figure 6  Transition function with c =0. Sensitivity analysis to the slope parameter γ (page 52) 
 
 
B    Linearity Test and estimation 
 
The estimation of a TV- cointegration STR model is computed in two stages.
32 The first step 
is to test the null hypothesis of coefficients  constancy or the linearity of the model (Choi 
Saikkonen, 2004). If it is rejected, we  can  then estimate a threshold specification   (Choi 
Saikkonen, 2004b). To explain each step more precisely, we consider the following cointegra-
tion STR specification with only one explanatory variable: 
 
 
where   is a continuous logistic transition function,   is the explanatory variable. 
Finally, K lead and lag terms are added to the specification to resolve the serial and contem-
poraneous correlation between regressors and error terms and the error term   is stationary. 
The statistical tests proposed by Choi and Saikkonen (2004) extend previous tests of 
linearity against STR models. Testing for linearity in a cointegrating STR model (equation 4) 
                                                 
32 Estimation of a TV cointegrating STR model is identical to estimation of a cointegrating STR model, with the 
only difference being that the threshold variable is known: it is time. Anne-Laure Delatte, Julien Fouquau and  
Carsten A. Holz 
Explaining money demand in China during the transition  




  34 
can be done by testing H0:   or H0:  . In both cases, the test is non-standard since 
the cointegrating STR model contains unidentified nuisance parameters under H0 (Davies, 
1987). The usual solution is to replace the transition function  , by its first-order Tay-
lor expansion around   and to test an equivalent hypothesis in an auxiliary regression:  
 
    (5) 
 
where εt is the Taylor series approximation error. In these auxiliary regressions, parameters θ2 
is proportional to the smooth parameter γ of the transition function. Thus, testing the linearity 
against the cointegration STR model simply consists of testing H0:   in (5) for a logistic 
function. To do so, Choi and Saikkonen (2004) proposed to use a LM test which follows a 
standard chi square limiting distribution with p degrees of freedom where p is the number of 
explanatory variables affected by the transition function.  
When the null hypothesis of linearity is rejected, a cointegrating STR model can be 
estimated. Standardly in a stationary context, the estimation method of a smooth transition 
regression model is non linear least squares (NLLS). However, Choi and Saikkonen (2004b) 
have studied the statistical properties of the NLLS methodology in a cointegrating STR with-
out leads and lags. They show that under the regressor-error dependence the asymptotic dis-
tribution of the NLLS estimator for the cointegrating STR model involves a bias. To circum-
vent the subsequent inefficiency of NLLS estimator, they propose a Gauss–Newton type esti-
mator that uses the NLLS estimator as an initial estimator and is based on nonlinear regres-
sions augmented by leads and lags. 
More precisely, the first step consists in estimating all the parameters without leads 
and lags by the NLLS methodology (see van Dijk, Terasvirta and Franses, 2002). A practical 
issue that deserves special attention in the estimation of the STR model is the selection of 
starting values of the parameters in the transition function. To improve the algorithm conver-
gence, we apply a densely grid search to get the ―good‖ starting value of  . 
33 These esti-
mators will be then used to obtain an efficient two step estimators based on the leads and lags 
modification.  
                                                 
33 Given a couple of  , the estimation of  the slope coefficients  and   is obtained by ordinary least 
square. We use the values of the threshold variable    between the first and the third quartile for the location 
parameter and 50 positive values in majority near zero for the smooth parameter since the transition is very 
quickly sharp. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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The Gauss-Newton estimator is defined by: 
 
 
where  is estimated by the NLLS methodology,   are the NLLS esti-
mated residual and   with   and: 
 
 
Choi and Saikkonen (2004b) show that this Gauss–Newton estimator eliminates the bias and 
has a mixture normal distribution in the limit. This result is important because it implies the 
estimator efficiency and that standard hypothesis tests can be performed. In the next Section, 
we present the time-varying estimations results.  
 
 
VI  Non-linear money demand 
 
The first step in our testing strategy is to test the linear specification of  money holdings 
against an alternative specification with time-varying coefficients. Under the null hypothesis, 
we use the optimal cointegration relationships obtained in each circuit in the linear estima-
tions (Spec 2a in Table 4 and Table 5). We test the linear specification against the alternative 
TV-cointegrating STR model in Eq. 4. If linearity is rejected, the second step consists in esti-
mating a time-varying relationship.  
 
 
A    The Enterprise circuit 
 
In specification 2a we already capture a determinist non-linearity through the inclusion of the 
monetization trend (the square of the transaction variable). This approach is usual in the litera-
ture and satisfying to account for the acceleration of income elasticity during the monetization 
process. Now we would like to relax the stability hypothesis upon the other determinants. Anne-Laure Delatte, Julien Fouquau and  
Carsten A. Holz 
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Therefore, in specification 2a, we allow the coefficients of three variables to vary with time: 
short-term loans, the complementarity hypothesis, and opportunity cost.
34  
We follow Choi and Saikkonen (2004) and test linearity against the TV-cointegrating 
STR including from one to three leads and lags (K=1 to 3). As in Choi and Saikkonen (2004), 
we reject the hypothesis of linearity if the LM test rejects the null for at least one value of K. 
Results in Table 6 indicate that linearity is rejected with all lags (t 1 = 8.9, 8.1, 9.0 respec-
tively, which follows a  at a 5% significant level). To check the robustness, we 
also test specifications allowing only two coefficients to vary. The conclusion is not affected. 
We can proceed with the estimation.  
Table 6 reports the estimated value of the parameters: the location parameter, c, the 
smooth parameter, γ, and the coefficients in the extreme regimes.
35 Two preliminary com-
ments are already possible. First, all coefficients are significant in regime 2, which means that 
they have all been modified over the period. Second, the value of  γ is 0.66, implying a rela-
tively smooth slope. Lastly, the location parameter is c= 35.7 which indicates that the transi-
tion has taken place 36 quarters after the beginning of our sample, i.e. during the nineties after 
the 1993 reform.  
Figure 7 shows the evolution over time of the coefficients of the demand for money 
in the enterprise circuit. In order to show more precisely the transition mechanism, we plot the 
coefficient of the different determinants with a focus on the period 1990 through 2000. The 
impact of the coefficients changes over the period, with an obvious overall transition between 
1993 and 1997. Lee and Chien (2008) who estimated a standard demand for money detected a 
structural change in 1993. Our location parameter is therefore consistent with their finding 
although we show that the reform process lasted four years until 1997. 
Regarding the credit plan, its influence over money holdings in the enterprise circuit 
has faded away from   to  0.02. This is a strong finding because it means 
that the credit plan has been completely dissolute at the end of the 1990s. In sum, in the 
2000s, monetary policy has not significantly relied on this quantitative tool to control money 
holdings in the productive sector.  
Regarding the complementarity hypothesis, we find that the coefficient is significant, 
positive, and increases from   to  0.91. More precisely it is the first de-
                                                 
34 Despite a large range of initial parameters, the inclusion of four variables in the transition does not yield a cor-
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terminant over the entire period and its weight has increased. This time evolution means that 
the main motivation of enterprises‘ money holdings has been to finance investment and this 
motivation has become greater over the period. 
Regarding the opportunity cost, the coefficient of the interest rate is negative (first 
regime coefficient   implying an opportunity cost of holding money, from the 
beginning, in the enterprise circuit. In the second regime, it is still significantly negative and 
only slightly smaller in absolute terms than before, with a coefficient of  -0.60.  
Figure 8 plots the monetization process in the enterprise circuit. The chart confirms 
that the growth of money balances has not decreased relatively to the volume of transactions 
in the enterprise circuit. It is consistent with the finding that money is complementary to capi-
tal in China.  
To check the robustness of our results, we estimate an alternative model. Since the 
interest rate coefficient has the smallest variation in proportion, we impose its stability. We 
consistently obtain the same qualitative dynamics: the complementarity hypothesis signifi-
cantly increases while the credit plan influence disappears.
36 The location parameter is similar 
(c= 38) which confirms that the transition has taken place during the nineties after the 1993 
reform. 
To conclude, the reason for holding money in the productive sector is to finance i n-
vestment projects. This is due to limited access to credit, which explains why we find that the 
credit plan is not an effective monetary instrument anymore. Most enterprises finance inves t-
ment with their own funds and are therefore not sensitive to credit tightening. The increasing 
influence of this motivation during the 2000s can probably be expla ined by low real interest 
rate, implying that enterprises have earned a higher real return when money financed inves t-
ment rather than interest-bearing assets. It can also explain why the opportunity cost has not 
gained weight during the period in the enterprise circuit.  
 
Table 6  Non-Linear Demand for Money in the Enterprise Circuit (page 60) 
Figure 7  Time-Varying Coefficients of the Demand for Money in the Enterprise Circuit Link (page 52) 
Figure 8   Time-Varying Coefficients of the Demand for M1 (page 53) 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
35 For the sake of parsimony, we present only the results including one lead and lag. Other results are available 
upon request. 
36 Imposing the stability of another coefficient  does not alter the evolution patterns. The results are available 
upon request.  Anne-Laure Delatte, Julien Fouquau and  
Carsten A. Holz 
Explaining money demand in China during the transition  




  38 
B    Aggregate money demand (M1) 
 
We allow every coefficient to vary except the monetization trend. The results reported in Ta-
ble 7 indicate that linearity is rejected with lags 2 and 3 (t1 = 7.74 and 10.35, respectively, 
which follow a  at a 10% significant level). It is also rejected in the specifica-
tions with only two time-varying coefficients.  
As previously, all coefficients are significant in regime 2, which means that they 
have all been modified over the period. The value of γ is 0.28, implying a smoother transition 
than in the enterprise circuit. This smoother transition is clear in Figure 8 which plots the evo-
lution of all coefficients for the period 1990 through 2000. The beginning of the transition in 
the case of M1 is consistent with the previous case of the enterprise circuit, which confirms 
the influence of the financial and monetary reform in 1993. Because the transition is smoother 
in the aggregate, the transition ends around 2000.  
Regarding the transaction motive, the coefficient of GDP decreases from   
to  0.5. This decrease is less pronounced when the coefficient of GDP is summed 
up to the positive coefficient of the monetization trend. Figure 9 pictures the monetization 
process. We observe that the growth of deposits has almost not decreased relatively to the 
volume of transaction over time. 
Regarding the complementarity hypothesis, its increasing influence found in the en-
terprise  circuit  is  confirmed.  The  coefficient  strongly  increases  from    to 
1.6. In the case of M1, it is also the first determinant of money holdings and the 
estimator is significantly high in comparison with other developing economies.
37 It means that 
it is a salient feature of the Chinese economy. We find that money has increasingly worked as 
a complement to capital over the period.  
Regarding the opportunity cost effect, contrary to the enterprise circuit, the opport u-
nity cost is almost zero before the transition ( and becomes significant and nega-
tive only later ( . This means that the deposit interest rate has worked  as a 
significant opportunity cost only in the 2000s. However the estimated coefficient is low in 
comparison with the complementarity effect (-0.19 versus 1.6). Thus, the opportunity cost of 
holding money is still not a prominent incentive to choose the le vel of money holdings. It is 
interesting to observe that our linear results indicated a significant opportunity cost over the 
                                                 
37 For example, the coefficient was estimated at 0.057 and 0.07 for India and Pakistan by Pentecost and Moore 
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entire period (the linear estimated coefficient value was -0.12, i.e. inside the interval between 
the two extreme regimes). As mentioned above, previous studies also find a significant oppor-
tunity cost during the 1990s (Bahman-Oskoee and Wang, 2007). Our non-linear result that the 
interest rate starts being significant only in the 2000s underlines the importance to properly 
account for linearity.  
The qualitative dynamics are confirmed in a specification imposing a stable coeffi-
cient upon GDP: the interest rate is close to zero and becomes negative and significant only 
after the reform, while the complementarity effect increases (Table 7).  
In sum, the non-linear estimation underscores the emergence of opportunity costs 
only after the wave of financial reforms in the 1990s; even after the dissolution of the credit 
plan, the interest rate is still a minor monetary policy instrument in China; and our result high-
light the increasing role of self-finance to explain money holdings in China. This last finding 
reflects the documented increasing gap between real economic growth and the slow develop-
ment of financial intermediation in China (Podpiera 2006, OECD 2005). The limited access to 
loanable funds combined with the low real interest rates gives an incentive to accumulate 
money in order to finance investment. This pattern obviously limits the scope of the monetary 
policy, a policy implication that we comment on in the conclusions.  
 
Table 7  Non-Linear Aggregate Demand for Money (M1) (page 60) 
Figure 9   Monetization Trend of the Demand for Agregate Money (M1) (page 53) 
 
 
VII  Conclusions 
 
This paper estimates long run, equilibrium money demand functions for China from 1984 to 
2010, explicitly taking into consideration the changes in the institutional characteristics of 
China‘s financial system and allowing for a non-linear functional form. Given the slow pro-
gress of reform in the monetary system, a central question of the paper is to what extent China 
has a meaningful demand for money.  
To do justice to the origins of China‘s current monetary system, we examine the dis-
aggregate money balances in both household and enterprise circuits. Then we estimate the 
demand for M1. To do so, we use a constructed dataset with quarterly frequency spanning 
from 1984 to 2010. Given the seasonal patterns in several series, we use the seasonal unit-root 
test developed by Hylleberg et al. (1990) to disentangle seasonal peaks from a pure random Anne-Laure Delatte, Julien Fouquau and  
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walk.  Lastly, we use the cointegrating Time-Varying Smooth Transition Regression (TV-
STR) model proposed by Choi and Saikkonen (2004). Our novel procedure and extensive 
dataset yield new results.  
First, in the household circuit, the consideration of seasonal unit roots yields statisti-
cal evidence of persistent state control over household decision  on the allocation of money 
holdings. Contrary to standard stationary tests used in much of the earlier literature which 
(mis)conclude that currency in circulation (m0) is non-stationary, our seasonal unit-root test 
reveals that m0 and household deposits are stationary. They vary steadily along an upward 
trend. This property suggests that household have an infinite demand for money at prevailing 
interest rates.  
In contrast, economic reforms resulted in a profit-oriented corporate sector, a fact 
that has given enterprises an incentive to gain autonomy on their money holdings. Our non-
linear methodology finds that in the enterprise circuit the credit plan has ceased being a sig-
nificant driver of money holdings in the 2000s. In turn, we find that the main motivation to 
hold money balances is to finance investment, a factor that was ignored by the earlier litera-
ture. This motivation has become more prominent over the period, which can be explained by 
the limited access to credit and the low real interest rate in China.  
Lastly, in our final aggregate money demand estimation, we find that the deposit in-
terest rate has gained only a minor role as a monetary instrument during the 2000s. This is 
probably due to the fact that money is a complement rather than a substitute to capital in 
China. In fact, aggregate estimation confirms the increasing influence of the complementarity 
effect upon money holdings.  
Our results have policy implications. The later in the period, the more the demand for 
money fits standard theory in China. As a consequence, we suspect that China‘s central bank 
had good reasons to adopt money supply targeting by 1999 only. However, the environment 
of negative or low real interest rates has limited the scope of monetary policy. On the one 
hand, market-based interest rates are necessary to turn the infinite money demand of house-
holds into a rational allocation choice of their money balances. This will extend the central 
bank‘s influence upon the real economy. The further development of government and corpo-
rate bonds market may advance the transition toward market-based interest rates. On the other 
hand, the Chinese banking system has only played a limited intermediary role between sav-
ings and productive investments. Consequently, the monetary policy can not use the credit 
channel to influence the real economy in the short run. Moreover, a properly regulated bank-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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ing system is also likely to be more efficient in allocating savings to investment than self-
finance is. Lastly, the Chinese banking system has not yet reaped the benefits of the extraor-
dinary dynamism of the real sector. In contrast, bank loans have kept on financing poor-
performing projects, a fact that has led to considerably deterioration in bank balance sheets 
and is posing a serious threat to the project of harmonious growth in China.  Anne-Laure Delatte, Julien Fouquau and  
Carsten A. Holz 
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Note: Fan (1993) is the source for all planned change in credit data 1983-1992, NPC 31 March 1993, 11 March 
1994, and 18 March 1995 for 1993, 1994 and 1995. The actual change in credit data in Fan 1993 (who presents 
data for the years 1983 to 1992) differs slightly from the one used here (from the Statistical Yearbook and China 
Financial Statistics) in an unsystematic fashion in the years 1983-85 and 1992. Potential reasons are different 
years for the inclusion of the Construction Bank of China in the state bank balance sheet in the early 1980s, and 
possibly the inclusion of other financial institutions than state banks in Fan (1993) in 1992. It is assumed  here 
that the planned credit figure covers state banks only, which may no longer be true in the 1990s; if planned credit 
in the mid-1990s were to include all financial institutions in China, then the actual credit figure in this graph is 
too low (since it only covers state banks).  
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Figure 8   Time-Varying Coefficients of the Demand for M1 
 


















































Figure 9   Monetization Trend of the Demand for Agregate Money (M1) 
 

















Table 1  Disbursements and Receipts of Cash by State Banks 
    In % of total disbursements (or receipts) per annum     



















Others  Curr. in 
circul. 
D - R 
Receipts          Goods  Services  Tax                (b yuan)  (b yuan) 
1978 D  135.26  45.6  9.5  6.5  X  X  X  21.9  X  X  9.6  X  2.8  4.0     
R  133.60  X  X  X  71.3  7.9  0.4  4.1  X  X   10.7  X  2.0  3.7  21.20  1.66 
1985 D  569.48  31.4  14.7  6.4  X  X  X  19.2  3.0  1.0  17.7  X  1.6  5.0     
R  549.91  X  X  X  52.1  5.8  0.7  10.6  1.5  0.7  22.6  X  1.5  4.6  98.78  19.57 
1986 D  684.39  31.5  14.8  6.0  X  X  X  17.9  3.2  1.0  19.2  X  1.6  4.8     
R  661.33  X  X  X  49.6  5.8  0.7  10.5  1.5  0.6  25.1  X  1.4  4.7  121.84  23.06 
1987 D  901.57  27.9  13.2  5.9  X  X  X  16.9  3.6  1.3  23.4  0.8  1.5  5.7     
R  877.96  X  X  X  44.4  5.6  0.7  10.2  1.7  0.8  29.2  0.8  1.5  5.1  145.45  23.61 
1988 D  1349.0  23.6  11.1  5.9  X  X  X  14.3  3.4  1.3  30.1  1.4  1.5  7.4     
R  1281.1  X  X  X  40.7  5.1  0.6  8.2  1.8  0.9  33.8  1.1  1.5  6.3  213.40  67.95 
1989 D  1526.8  24.1  10.1  6.1  X  X  X  11.8  3.0  1.3  32.9  1.5  1.5  7.8     
R  1505.8  X  X  X  36.4  5.2  0.7  7.3  1.6  0.8  38.0  1.4  1.5  7.0  234.40  21.00 
1990 D  1747.1  23.9  10.0  6.3  X  X  X  11.1  2.9  1.2  33.3  1.5  1.6  8.1     
R  1717.1  X  X  X  33.1  5.6  0.7  7.9  1.6  0.8  40.2  1.6  1.7  6.7  264.44  30.04 
1991 D  2199.9  22.1  8.5  6.3  X  X  X  11.1  3.0  1.3  36.1  1.6  1.6  8.3     
R  2146.5  X  X  X  30.8  5.6  0.7  7.7  1.7  0.9  41.9  1.9  1.9  6.9  317.78  53.34 
1992 D  3240.6  18.8  5.7  6.4  X  X  X  10.3  3.0  1.4  41.1  1.9  1.8  9.5     
R  3124.8  X  X  X  26.6  5.3  0.6  6.6  1.7  0.8  45.4  2.0  2.0  8.8  433.60  115.82 
1993 D  5041.3  15.8  4.5  6.8  X  X  X  8.4  2.7  1.5  45.3  2.6  1.7  10.7     
R  4888.4  X  X  X  23.0  5.0  0.6  5.9  1.8  0.9  48.5  2.6  1.7  10.2  586.47  152.87 
1994 D  7267.1  15.4  4.3  6.5  X  X  X  6.1  2.8  1.7  47.4  2.9  1.7  11.2     
R  7124.7  X  X  X  20.2  4.8  0.5  4.7  2.1  1.2  51.7  3.2  1.8  9.8  728.86  142.39 
1995 D  9672.6  13.3  3.7  5.8  X  X  X  4.8  2.7  1.9  51.1  3.0  1.7  12.0     
R  9732.2  X  X  X  17.8  4.3  0.5  3.8  2.2  1.5  54.3  3.7  1.9  10.0  788.54  59.68 
Notes: 
1:  Salaries and wages 
2:  Procurement of agricultural and sideline products 
3:  Management expenses of administrative units 
4:  Sales of goods 
5:  Sales of services 
6:  Tax income 
7:  Rural credit cooperatives (cash disbursements vs. receipts) 
8:  Township and village enterprises (expenditures vs. receipts in cash) 
9:  Business-related expenses vs. receipts of self-employed 
10:  Savings withdrawals vs. deposits 
11:  Urban credit cooperatives, since 1994 “other banking institutions” (cash disbursements vs. 
receipts) 
12:  Remittances (outgoing vs. incoming) 
13:  Other disbursements vs. receipts 
X:  Entry not meaningful or values below 0.05%. 
Sources: China Financial Statistics 1952-1987; Finance Yearbook 1994; Statistical Yearbook 1996. 
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Table 2  Standard and Seasonal Unit Root Tests 
 
   Dickey Fuller  Phillips 
Perron 
KPSS  HEGY  
  
         
GDP  -1.86 (c)  -7.55*** (c)  0.18** (c)  -1.97 ( e)  -2,31  0.30  -3.35***  5.68* 
Industrial Output   -2.32 (c)  -4.35*** (c)  0.18** (c)  -2.40 (e )  2.73*  -1.90  -1.78*  3,46 
Entreprise Deposits  -0.43 (b)  -0.56 (b)  1.16***(b)  -1.75 (e )  -9.27***  -2.90  -5.58**  22.3*** 
Household deposits   -1.43 (b)  -4.56*** (b)  0.30*** (c)  -3.22** (d)  -2.83*  -2,59  -4,6  15.7*** 
Cash (m0)  -2.02 (c)  -1.98 (c)  0.29*** (c)  -2.83* (d)  -2,05  -3,09  -2.82**  9.65** 
M1  -2.12 (c)  -2.02 (c)  0.25*** (c)  -1.94 (e )  -10.8***  -2.58  -5.63***  21.4*** 
CPI Index  -3.28* (c)  -1.99** (a)  0.07 (c)  -3.25* '( c )  -6.12***  -1.57*  -9.53***  50.7*** 
Current deposit interest rate  -2.39 (c)  -2.18 (c)  0.14** (c)  -2.38 (c )  -7.33***  -3.78***  -6.12***  33.6*** 
1-year-fixed-deposit interest rate  -1.05 (a)  -1.07 (a)  0.92*** (b)  -2.02 (c )  -7.18***  -3.45***  -6.76***  36.5*** 
5-year fixed-term deposit interest rate  -3.43** (c )  -2.78 (c )  0.10 (c )  -2.70 (c )  -5.57***  -2.57**  -8.16***  43.7*** 
5 year fixed-term deposit interest rate with retail prices 
indexation 
-3.72** (b )  -3.41*** (b )  0.06 (b)  -4.09*** (b)  -4.15***  -3.33***  -4.19***  14.0*** 
Real 5-year-fixed-term deposit interest rate   -2.24 (c)  -0.84 (a)  0.12* (c)  -4.25*** (b)  -4.32***  -3.04***  -4.65***  15.5*** 
Up-to-one-year short term loan rate  -2.36 (c)  -2.14 (c)  0.13* (c)   -1.82 (b )  -4.72***  -3.52***  -3.80***  13.7*** 
Real growth rate of industial output   -3.77*** (b)  -3.88*** (b)  0.08 (b)  -2.75* (c )  -5.58***  -7.14***  -6.11***  44.9*** 
Real growth of disposable income     -6.37*** (b)  -6.45*** (b)  0.11 (b)  -4.90** (c )  -6.74***  -9.21***  -1.58*  47.2*** 
US vs. China Interest rate spread   -2.02** (a)  -1.94** (a)  0.10 (b)  -2.34** (a)  -5.61***  -4.85***  -7.65***  - 
CPI Inflation rate  -2.56 (c)  -3.32** (b)  0.11 (b)  -3.28*(c )  -6.16***  -2.02**       -9.58***  53.5*** 
Investment   -3.52** (c)  -9.40*** (c)  0.06 (c)   -3.74** (e )  -4.05***  -6.24***  -4.77***  45.5*** 
Household Disposable Income  -1.17 (b)  -1.36 (b)  1.13*** (b)  -0.99 (d)  -3.99***  -6.01***  -1.34  19.0*** 
Living Expenditures  2.58 (a)  -2.61 (c)  0.23*** (c)  -1.08 (d)  -3.94***  -4.43***  2.74***  13.6*** 
Total Loans   -1.72 (b)  -2.02 (c)  0.26*** (c)  -1.90 (c )  -9.18***  -3.61***  5.38***  25.4*** 
Short-term Loans  -2.45 (b)  -2.88** (b)  0.27*** (c)   -1.81 (b)  -4.72***  -3.53***  -3.80***  13.9*** 
Retail Sales  -3.10 * (c)  -4.20*** (c)  0.11* (c)  -2.54 (e )  -2,38  -3.53***  -3.28***  12.7*** 
                  As usual, all variables in small letters denote variables in logarithm. Specification including: (a) no intercept no trend, (b) intercept, (c) intercept and trend (d) intercept and seasonal dummy, (e) 
intercept, trend and seasonal dummy. Null hypothesis : unit root in Dickey Fuller and Philips Perron tests; stationarity in KPSS.  56 
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real growth of  
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deposit interest rate 
1-year deposit interest rate, 





Aggregate money demand (M1) 
 
GDP  squared GDP 
 
 
real growth of industrial 
output,  real 5-year deposit 
interest rate 
1-year deposit interest rate, 1-year loan 
interest rate, 5-year deposit interest rate, 
five-year deposit interest rate indexed to 











Spec 1a  Spec 1b  Spec 2a  Spec 2b  Spec 3a  Spec 3b  Spec 3c  Spec 3d  Spec 4 




0.08 (3.5)  included  0.09 (4.8)  0.04 (2.7)                
Investment              included  included  included  included    
Short term loans  0.16 (1.6)  included  0.11 (1.6)  0.21 (2.7)  included  included  included  included  included 
Real growth of 
industrial output 








   included     -0.22 (-
12.1) 
included     included       
1-year loan 
interest rate 








            included  included  included  included    
Schwartz criterion        -4.61  -4.53                
 “*” : cointegrated at 10% (Philips and Ouliaris critical values). “included” denotes variables initially included in a vector in which cointegration was rejected. A Schwartz criterion is used to 
select the optimal cointegration relationship.  58 
 
Table 5  Linear Demand for M1 
 
 
M1  Spec 1a  Spec 1b  Spec 1c  Spec 1d  Spec 1e  Spec 2a   Spec 2b  Spec 2c  Spec 2d  Spec 2e 
Cointegration 
tests 
-6.2***  -6.0***  -4.7**  -4.2  -5.9***  -6.1***  -5.9***  -4.7**  -4.1*  -5.8*** 
GDP  0.15 (6.7)  0.17 (7.2)  0.07 (2.4)  included  0.14 (5.6)  0.13 (19)  0.15 (20.3)  0.18 (9.9)  0.13 (13)  0.13 (17) 








                   
1-year deposit 
interest rate 
-0.12 (-7.5)          -0.12 (-10)         
1-year loan 
interest rate 
  -0.28 (-7.6)          -0.25 (-10)       
NEER      0.1 (1.7)          0.2 (3.1 )     
US-China 
Spread 
      included          0.003 (2.0)   
5-year 
nominal 
interest rate  
        -0.1 (-5.9)          -0.09 (-8.4) 





          -4.6   -4.5      -4.44 
“*, **, ***” : cointegrated at 10% , 5%, 1% (Philips and Ouliaris critical values). “included” denotes variables initially included in a vector in which cointegration was rejected. A Schwartz 










Table 5   Cont’: Linear demand for M1  
 
 
M1  Spec 3a  Spec 3b  Spec 3c  Spec 3d  Spec3e  Spec 4a   Spec 4b  Spec 4c  Spec 4d  Spec 4e 
Cointegration 
tests 
-2.4  -2.6  -3.2  -2.9  -3  -2.4  -2.6  -3.7  -3.5  -3 
GDP  included  included  included  included  included  included  included  included  included  included 








included  included  included  included  included  included  included  included  included  included 
1-year deposit 
interest rate 
included          included          
1-year loan 
interest rate 
  included          included        
NEER      included          included      
US-China 
Spread 
      included          included    
5-year 
nominal 
interest rate  
        included          included 
Squared GDP  included  included  included  included  included  included  included  included  included  included 
Schwartz 
riterion 
                             
“*, **, ***” : cointegrated at 10%, 5%, 1% (Philips and Ouliaris critical values) 
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Table 6  Non-Linear Demand for Money in the Enterprise Circuit 
 
   Specification   Specification 2 
  
    
            




 -0.62    
(-21.3)  (6.94) 
 
(-34.0)    
Real growth rate of  
industrial output  
0.53 
  
0.28  0.48     0.76 
(5.14)  (2.48)  (4.52)  (7.91) 
  Short term loans  0.￿ 6 
  
 -0.24  0.42      -0.42 
(5.15)  (-4.01)  (9.10)  (-7.69) 
  Industrial output  
0,069   -0.11 
(1.53)  (-2.87) 
Squared Industrial output  0.004  0.007 
(4.67)  (10.2) 
[γ,c]  [0.658; 35.7]  [0.522; 38.6] 
t1 [K= 1; 2; 3]     [ 8.9;  8.1; 9.0]  | 6.3; 2.1; 0.2 ] 




Table 7  Non-Linear Aggregate Demand for Money (M1) 
 
 
















-0.15  0.006 
 
-0.15 
(-8.53)  (-35.2)  (1.66) 
 
(-45.5) 




0.52  1.51 
 
0.05 
(42.8)  (34.4)  (81.1)  (29.2) 
  GDP  0.13 
 
-0.08  0.32 
(20.9)  (-29.7)  (235) 
  Squared GDP 
0.035  -0.0005 
(27.0)  (-26.2) 
[γ,c]  ￿ 0.278 ; 41.6]  [0.66; 45.7] 
t1 [K= 1; 2; 3]  [ 5.9; 7.2; 10.0]  [4.6;  6.7; 8.5] 
 and    are coefficient values, t-student are in parenthesis. Lead =3. 
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